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Transnational memory from Bleiburg to London (via Buenos Aires and Grozny)1 
 
1.Introduction 
 
The starting-point for this contribution is the summer 1945 in Carinthia, when the British 
Eighth Army handed over thousand of anti-communist, collaborationist and fascist soldiers to 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Those affected included Cossacks who had been fighting 
against partisans in Yugoslavia and Italy, Croat Ustaša, regular soldiers of the Croat army, 
Slovene home guard (Domobranci), Serb Četniks, followers of the Serb fascist leader Dmitr 
Ljotić and many others. As well as these soldiers, who had fled northwards in the wake of the 
retreating German forces, many of the civilians accompanying them were also handed over. 
Although there are no reliable figures it seems likely the total number probably exceeded a 
hundred thousand. Many of them were sent to the Gulag while thousands of those handed 
over to Yugoslavia were massacred.2  
Clearly these events, including the British decisions which led to them, have been and still 
are, hotly debated. However the main point of this contribution is not to contribute directly to 
these controversies, but rather to explore how these events have been commemorated over the 
past sixty years. Without going further into the complex theoretical and methodological 
discussion around the “memory turn” two brief comments on the risks involved in this kind 
of shift to the “meta-level” seem in order here. The first risk is a weakening of the response to 
the moral issues posed so acutely in the age of genocide, and which in the best cases, have 
driven the empirical recovery of the recent past. If attention is centred on the logic of 
collective memory or narrativity, central issues of guilt and responsibility may easily become 
sidelined. To deflect or pre-empt the charge that the current article represents an example of 
precisely this kind of evasion let me repeat here the conclusion I drew twenty years ago (as 
part of a criticism of the work of Nikolai Tolstoy): 
 
The hand-over of Cossacks and ‘dissident’ Yugoslavs from Southern Austria in May 
and June 1945 was a decision made at a time of crisis and pressure. The responsibility 
for going for a ‘convenient’ solution at a time of acute difficulty lay primarily with 
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the military commanders concerned....The question of the morality of the hand-overs 
will doubtless continue to be discussed. Such discussion needs to address the question 
of how much those who made the decisions knew or could have reasonably been 
expected to know about the likely fate of those returned. Above all such discussion 
can only benefit from an open-minded and even-handed use of the evidence, neither 
of which is conspicuous in Tolstoy’s work. Few would question now that, especially 
insofar as they concerned innocent civilians, the hand-overs involved expediency, 
brutality and inhumanity. But…they need to be understood in the context of a war 
which had seen a massive escalation of all of these – an escalation to which many of 
those handed over had contributed their full share.3   
 
Secondly, the danger of privileging the “constructivity” of the past over its empirical 
exploration can lead to the kind of questionable argument put forward recently by Klaus 
Leggewie. It effectively endorses the instrumentalisation of memory by the holders of power 
and implies – doubtless for the best of motives - that historians should enrol as construction 
workers on a grandiose EU memory-building project. This task arises from “our” supposed 
need for a shared European memory in order to underpin “our” European museum. 
Leggewie’s draft proposals for this memory consist of seven concentric circles of memory, of 
which the Holocaust, Gulag and Expulsions form the first three. It is not so much the 
particular choice which is the problem (Leggewie’s circles are as good or at least as debatable 
as any others) as the top-down assumption behind it.4 Surely historians should be more 
interested in the way social memory evades grand projects like this and thus defies the 
continuous attempts of power-holders to manipulate them. What emerges through the gaps 
between Leggewie’s circles may well be more interesting and even more powerful than what 
is officially inscribed within them.  
The following article seeks to trace the unpredictable trajectory of several different collective 
memories of the 1945 hand-overs. It employs as a code and point of reference the small town 
of Bleiburg at the Austrian-Yugoslav border where most of the Yugoslavs were turned back. 
“Bleiburg” also stands here as a site of memory for other physical locations, including 
Viktring, near Klagenfurt, where over 10,000 Domobranci and their families were quartered, 
and Lienz, where the main part of the Cossack forces and their “camp followers” stayed 
before being handed over. 
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2. Heimat and Diaspora commemoration 
 
In first two post-war decades two relevant strands of commemoration can be identified: the 
first, which can be labelled “diaspora commemoration”, was sustained by the bereaved 
relatives of those handed over and survivors themselves. It was articulated and led by a 
segment of the many Yugoslavs and East European Displaced Persons who, often after 
several years in camps, joined established diaspora communities in West Germany 
(especially Munich), North and South America and Australia.5 Some of their accounts were 
published soon after the war in Munich, New York, Buenos Aires, Cleveland and elsewhere. 
From around the mid-1950s survivors or their families also began to return to Bleiburg (or 
Lienz) and held memorial services there, often on the anniversary of the hand-overs. In their 
accounts Bleiburg is a site both of a colossal national tragedy and a monstrous Allied 
betrayal. To cite Miha Krek (former Chairman of the National Committee for Slovenia and 
Vice-Premier of the Royal Yugoslav Government), the dramatis personae of the Bleiburg 
atrocity were “the English – fallacious tricksters; the Titoists – criminal fiends and murderers; 
and the Slovenian Home Guardsmen, the Serbian Volunteers and the Montenegrin Chetniks – 
the victims.”6  
As Krek’s failure to mention Croats suggests, diaspora commemoration, like the Yugoslavia 
diaspora itself, was deeply divided along national lines. While Serb (Yugoslav royalist) 
commemoration was generally linked to Slovene commemoration, both remained aloof from 
or hostile to Croat exile groups. In the account by the Serb Bor Karapandžić, for example, 
Tito surpasses Hitler, Stalin and Genghis Khan in evil and Bleiburg is the site where an 8,000 
Četnik force was disarmed and then forcefully returned to Tito’s Partisans “who murdered all 
these men in a most brutal fashion in the forests around Maribor in Slovenia.” The Croat 
Home Army (Domobran) is mentioned only once.7 Croat diaspora accounts on the other hand 
focussed on Bleiburg as the genocidal end of the Croat nation at the hands of their communist 
enemies. In Paul Hockenos’s assessment it “functioned as one of the psychological keystones 
for the émigrés’ self-understanding of their expatriation, their lives abroad, and their political 
work to rescue Croatia at all costs, and by all means necessary.” In the 1950s and 1960s the 
“history wars” waged in the diaspora occasionally spilled over into violence, kidnappings or 
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highjackings, directed against representatives of Tito’s Yugoslavia. One Croat group, active 
in the 1960s in West Germany, called itself the “the Avengers of Bleiburg”.8 The hand-over 
of Cossaks (and Vlasov soldiers from Germany) seems to have been less central to the 
Russian diaspora. One notable publication was the memoir of the Cossack leader Nikolai 
Krasnov, who survived ten years in the Gulag before emigrating to the USA.9 
Within Carinthia itself the predominant form of public commemoration of the summer of 
1945 centred on the preservation of the Heimat against the South Slav threat. This “Heimat 
commemoration” had its roots in the ethno-national confrontations of the nineteenth century, 
in the course of which political mobilisation and collective identities became polarised 
around the issue of loyalty to the province. Carinthia was imagined here as a quasi-sacred 
community which was culturally (sometimes racially) German and under permanent threat. 
The threat came from within, those Slovenes who resisted assimilation and from outside, 
Carinthia’s supposedly predatory South Slav neighbours. Apart from this disruption Carinthia 
was at its core a harmonious community, in which the majority of Slavs (labelled 
“Windisch”) endorsed the superiority of Deutschtum by being ready to assimilate, whether 
because of a collective character trait (loyalty) or a quasi-ethnic quality. The central reference 
point of this commemoration was the Abwehrkampf (defensive struggle) of 1918-19 and the 
pro-Austrian plebiscite vote of 10 October 1920. Bleiburg in this perspective was the  front-
line town which, after a long period under Yugoslav occupation, had confirmed both its 
German identity and its loyalty by voting 75% in favour of a future in Austria.10  
The commemoration of the defensive struggle and the values associated with it, particularly 
the military ones, were effectively deployed in the Greater German Reich and helped the 
Nazi regime and the war effort function almost until the end. After a brief self-critical 
interlude they continued to permeate post-war Carinthian political culture. The 10 October 
ceremonies, in parallel with the assertion of a narrowly majoritarian interpretation of self-
determination, recalled the courage and the sacrifice of the earlier generation.11  The blood 
which had been shed by the Abwehrkämpfer in 1920 was enrolled into a lofty mission to 
“keep” Carinthia German, in effect to increase the pressure on the minority to assimilate. In 
1960 the veteran German national activist Hans Steinacher laid down ex cathedra that 
“without the Carinthians’ struggle for freedom there would have been no plebiscite.”12 The 
Nazi war of annihilation and the invasion of Yugoslavia were decoupled from the Carinthian 
struggle or implicitly legitimated the defence of (western) European values against 
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Bolshevism.13 (Karl Stuhlpfarrer and Hanns Haas were among the first historians to question 
this perspective).14 
The end of the war appeared here not just as a German defeat but, with the partisan 
occupation of Carinthia at the end of the war in pursuit of Yugoslavia’s claim to southern 
Carinthia, as a real and symbolic violation of the Heimat. One aspect became the particular 
focus of post-war part Carinthian enquiries, agitation and concern: the seizures in May of 
some 200 Carinthians by the Yugoslav secret police (OZNA), half of whom were then 
presumably killed.15 It is hard to understand the particular stress placed on the 
commemoration of these kidnap victims (Verschleppten) purely in terms of the depth or 
extent of the trauma they aroused. There were after all plenty of other Carinthians who had 
suffered comparable bereavement, regardless of where they had fought. Rather the centrality 
of the “kidnapped” surely relates to the way they could sustain a narrative of Carinthian 
victimhood and Slav violation. In this narrative the end of the war moved centre stage and the 
preceding Nazi Germanisation and aggression receded. A narrative line could then be traced 
without much difficulty to the earlier “defensive struggle” (Abwehrkampf). For a leading 
Carinthian Social Democrat the period since 1910 had been a story of “two world wars and 
above all two Yugoslav invasions of Carinthia.”16 This elision of the victims of the 
Abwehrkampf, the fallen soldiers of two world wars and the kidnap victims of May 1945 is 
inscribed in many Carinthian war memorials, including that in Bleiburg. Anti-fascist 
commemoration, centring on the partisans by contrast, although it was sporadically supported 
by the federal government, was a marginalised counter-memory. Its physical monuments 
often faced strong local opposition, defacement or destruction (generally followed by an 
ineffective pursuit of the culprits).17 
Heimat commemoration clearly shared some important ground with diaspora 
commemoration, in particular the self-perception as victims of communists. Yet at this time 
apart from some fleeting references in apologia for the Wehrmacht18 the two strands seem to 
have had few points of contact. One reason may be the fact that refugees and surrendering 
solders, irrespective of their background, appeared to threaten scarce resources. In contrast to 
later romanticised accounts the Volkszeitung looked back in 1960 on the appearance of the 
Cossacks (and their horses) as the moment when “40,000 Cossacks threatened Upper 
Carinthia.”19 A rare example of linking Cossack and Carinthian victimhood was Theodor 
Veiter’s 1970 work on minority rights. Veiter, who had an ambiguous position in the 
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catholic, anti-communist camp, discussed the kidnappings in connection with the introduction 
of compulsory bilingual primary education into Southern Carinthia later in the same year 
(October 1945). He implied that the school had only been accepted under duress because the 
population had been intimidated by British collusion in the hand-overs and murder of 
thousands of German Carinthians and anticommunist Slovenes. For good measure he added 
an anti-Semitic twist by commenting that British security forces had been mainly in the hand 
of “German-speaking emigrants” (“deutschsprachige Emigranten”).20 
 
3. British commemoration 
 
As well as these two commemorative strands a third should also be discussed here, even 
though - or precisely because - Bleiburg was so marginal to it: the Allied celebration of the 
end of the war as Victory in Europe day on 7 May. In these ceremonies and the associated 
public discussion the hand-overs from Carinthia, perhaps unsurprisingly, played almost no 
part. Similarly all attempts to find out what happened, not just to Cossacks and Yugoslavs, 
but also to the (far more numerous) Vlasov soldiers handed over before and after the Yalta 
Agreement, were met in Britain, with official silence or stone-walling. There was also very 
little journalistic interest: a notable early exception was a 1946 article by George Orwell. It 
mentioned forced repatriations in the course of an extensive attack on those western 
communists or “fellow-travellers” who viewed the Soviet Union through rose-tinted glasses 
and denied the existence of Soviet “quislings” altogether. In fact, Orwell stated, a “small but 
not negligible portion of...Russian prisoners and displaced persons” had been forced to return 
against their will but “though known to many journalists on the spot, went almost 
unmentioned in the British press.”21 The official avoidance of the subject over the following 
Cold War decades, however, was presumably less a reflection of the pro-Soviet blindness 
castigated by Orwell than an acute embarrassment by politicians and officials at this 
compromise with the West’s partner in the “Grand Alliance”. Nevertheless, in an important 
sense the later discussion on the hand-overs was already visible in the 1950s and 1960s: 
under the broad heading of Yalta the topos of Western betrayal was becoming established. 
The alleged abandonment of Poland was the central plank of the indictment while those 
defenders of British policy who were not supporters of Stalin, adopted the “realist” defence 
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that the alliance and the Yalta agreement had been necessary to defeat Nazi Germany.22 The 
Yugoslav variant of the theme was the controversy about the British shift in support from 
Mihailović and the Četnik movement to Tito and the partisans. Fitzroy Maclean’s account of 
his 1943 discussion with Churchill (published in 1949) is probably the locus classicus of this 
kind of uneasy realism: 
‘Do you intend,’ [Churchill] asked, ‘to make Yugoslavia your home after the war?’  
‘No, Sir,’ I replied.  
‘Neither do I,’ he said. “And that being so, the less you and I worry about the form of 
Government they set up, the better. That is for them to decide. What interests us is, 
which of them is doing most harm to the Germans?’23  
However this famous exchange is judged (and Maclean is noticeably silent about the post-
war massacres) the point here is that the broad anti-communist consensus of the following 
decades did not bring any fundamental rejection of its basic assumptions. Neither was there 
any real alignment between Western commemoration of the end of the war and that of the 
Yugoslav diasporas. The latter remained on the margins, fragmented, suspected (sometimes 
justifiably) of fascist sympathies, or at best tolerated. This went hand-in-hand with a partial 
rehabilitation of Tito in the West following the Cominform dispute which turned him into a 
semi-respectable figure with influential supporters in the West, (includingMaclean himself). 
To Croat émigrés this compounded the earlier war-time betrayal of Bleiburg.24  
This does not mean, of course, that those officials and soldiers who had witnessed the hand-
overs or been involved in the decision-making had forgotten them, but their recollections 
took place outside the public sphere, transmitted orally as “communicative memory”, written 
in (as yet unpublished) diaries, or occasionally published to a limited audience, for example 
in regimental histories.25 It is clear from later accounts that some of them had been deeply 
troubled by what had happened and their own participation in it.26  
One of the earliest published references, largely based on diaries, was in the memoirs of 
Harold Macmillan, published in 1967. As UK Political Advisor to General Alexander at 
Allied Forces Head Quarters (AFHQ) he had flown to Five Corps Headquarters in Klagenfurt 
at the height of the crisis on 13 May. In his diary (in connection with the presence in Austria 
of “Russians and Bulgar forces”) he refers to “about 40,000 Cossacks and ‘White’ Russians 
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with their wives and children.” Leaving aside the controversy about what he actually meant 
by “‘White’ Russians” - which played an important role in the later controversy – what is 
striking about the whole passage is surely the unflattering light it sheds on the author. 
Macmillan portrays the issue as a basic choice between humanity and expediency (as well as 
the political need to adhere to the Yalta agreement) and makes it clear that it was the latter 
which prevailed. It was decided to hand over the troops and civilians even though this meant 
“condemning them to slavery, torture and probably death.”27 The inclusion of the passage in 
the memoir may be a tribute to Macmillan’s readiness to give an unvarnished picture of the 
truth or just a reflection of  lack of any previous British discussion, which might have made 
him more cautious (presumably he was unaware of the publications in the diaspora 
communities). Perhaps this also explains why the passage apparently did not prompt any 
strong reactions, negative or positive.28  Although there was nothing in his memoirs about the 
Yugoslavs, probably because no decision was taken at Klagenfurt, in his diary Macmillan had 
referred to “thousands of so-called Ustashi or Chetniks, mostly with wives and children” who 
were “fleeing in panic into the area.” He went on to express suspicions that the labels covered 
not just clear-cut collaborators, but also those who “either because they are Roman Catholics 
or Conservative in politics, or for whatever cause are out of sympathy with revolutionary 
Communism and therefore labelled as Fascists or Nazis.” In the light of the killings 
Macmillan’s final comment – that the application of labels “is a very simple formula, which 
in a modified form is being tried, I observe in English politics” - may appear offensively 
flippant.29 But it can also be read as a British attempt to “domesticate” the exotic “otherness” 
of those troops the British were dealing with, and thus also a kind of Balkanisation of a 
conflict, which many British observers perceived as impenetrably confused. 
 
4. Solzhenitsyn and the opening of archives 1970-1990 
At the risk of over-simplification, the changing patterns of “Bleiburg” commemoration after 
1970 can be distilled into two main trends; firstly, the increasing possibilities of transnational 
communication, which began to undermine the East-West divide; secondly, shifts in western 
attitudes to the Soviet Union, which helped make détente possible but also brought growing 
criticism of it. Both brought the uniquely powerful voice of Alexander Solzhenitsyn into the 
centre of Western discussions. In the Gulag Archipelago (the first volume of which was 
smuggled out to the West and published in 1974) he discussed the treatment of the 
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“Vlasovites,” whom he had met in the camps, in order to understand what he called “a 
phenomenon totally unheard of in all world history”:  “Several hundred thousand young men 
aged twenty to thirty took up arms against their Fatherland as allies of its most evil enemy.” 
Since their treason could not be explained biologically it had to have a “social cause.” After 
all “Well-fed horses don’t rampage....then picture to yourself a field in which starved, 
neglected, crazed horses are rampaging back and forth.”30 
Solzhenitsyn’s explanation lay, of course, in the extreme brutality of the Stalinist system, but 
he also launched a moral broadside against British and American leaders for supporting it by 
handing over its enemies to their destruction. In a BBC interview shortly afterwards 
Solzhenitsyn even compared this to the guilt of Nazi Germany or of European colonial 
powers, with the difference that the British guilt had yet to be expiated.31 Churchill’s decision 
was “an act of double-dealing consistent with the spirit of traditional English diplomacy.” But 
even as an act of duplicity the decision was baffling precisely since it appeared to run counter 
to western self-interest:  
To us, in our Russian prison conversations their consistent short-sightedness and 
stupidity stood out as astonishingly obvious. How could they, in their decline from 
1941 to 1945, fail to secure any guarantees whatever of the independence of Eastern 
Europe. ..And what was the military or political sense in their surrendering to 
destruction at Stalin’s hands hundreds of thousands of armed Soviet citizens 
determined not to surrender...?32  
 
Several of Solzhenitsyn’s basic assumptions fed into further discussions; for example, the 
view  if the hand-overs were not just as craven, but also irrational, which fostered later 
conspiracy theories; and the focus on the small group of émigré leaders who had fled Russia 
after the revolution and were not included in the terms of the Yalta agreement.33  
The force of Solzhenitsyn’s intervention was increased by the first historical accounts to 
make use of newly British archival resources, released under the terms of the 1967 Public 
Records Act. That lowered the time limit for the release of public files from fifty to thirty 
years (with some exceptions). Furthermore, from January 1972 documents relating to the 
Second World War, including the summer 1945 were also made accessible to researchers. 
The first work to exploit this liberalisation was The Last Secret by Nicholas Bethell (who had 
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translated Solzhenitsyn’s Cancer Ward in 1971), which included graphic first-hand accounts 
both from survivors and the war diaries of the British units responsible for the hand-overs, 
Nevertheless Bethell was rather restrained in his criticism of British decision-makers, seeing 
them at worst as naive and (in a variant of the standard criticism of Yalta)  mistaken in 
believing that failure to repatriate the Russians would encourage the Soviet government to 
break other clauses of the Yalta Agreement, which were “in political terms, far more 
important.”34 Bethell also argued that British decision had not been taken lightly and had 
followed a careful, painful weighing up of good and evil consequences. He thought that 
Solzhenitsyn would probably revise his own view in the light of the new evidence and 
concluded on a note of qualified optimism, and perhaps a reference to the arguments 
currently raging about détente, that later British governments might learn lessons about the 
importance of maintained Western values.  
Nikolai Tolstoy’s Victims of Yalta, published shortly afterwards (1977), also drew heavily on 
the British archives as well as previously unpublished eye-witness accounts, but its engaged 
and polemical tone was closer to Solzhenitsyn than to Bethell. It was also closer to diaspora 
perceptions of the hand-overs; according to his own (later) account, Tolstoy’s grandfather 
had fought “alongside” the Cossacks in the Russian civil war and he might himself have been 
shared their fate if he and his sister had not escaped deportation in “war-time Austria.” He 
therefore felt a duty to expose those responsible for “the unauthorised deaths of his 
defenceless compatriots.”35 Unlike Bethell’s qualified optimism his closing question mark 
echoed Solzhenitsyn’s bafflement. Where he differed from Solzhenitsyn was that he saw the 
betrayal not as a collective national act, but the result of a conspiracy by a small group of 
senior British officers and politicians against the nation and its values. He concluded that they 
were continuing to cover up their criminal misdeeds. 
Bethell and Tolstoy helped accelerate the debate in the British media and press. The domestic 
political context, following Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 election victory, may explain some of 
its intensity. Thatcher’s rhetoric implied a radical break with the consensual policies of her 
predecessors, known as “one nation conservatism” or derisively dismissed as “wet.” Abroad, 
Thatcher as “the iron lady,” stood for a hard line towards the Soviet Union and expressed the 
growing suspicion that détente had been a “one way street” to the benefit of the Soviet Union. 
This criticism allowed the British hand-overs to be seen, not just among conservatives, as part 
of a narrative of western pusillanimity. An indication of this was the unveiling of a 
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monument in 6 March 1982 to the victims of Yalta close to the Victoria and Albert Museum 
in central London (Bethell and Tolstoy also attended). According to inscription on the plinth 
the memorial 
was placed here by members of all parties in both Houses of Parliament and by many 
other sympathisers in memory of the countless innocent men women and children 
from the Soviet Union and other East European States who were imprisoned and died 
at the hands of communist governments after being repatriated at the end of the 
Second World War. May they rest in peace. 
Presumably in order to achieve as broad a consensus as possible) this wording left the 
question of agency open and made no reference at all to culpability. It also avoided stating 
clearly that all those handed over were in fact innocent and thus, arguably, avoided including 
members of the SS and other war criminals in its embrace. Similarly the sculpture by Angela 
Connor, which was installed (after the first memorial had been demolished by unknown 
actors), entitled “Twelve Responses to Tragedy,” consists of twelve figures, who might be 
vaguely identifiable as Eastern European or “Caucasian”, but do not appear to be soldiers.  
 
The political edge may have been blunted in this inscription but it was clearly expressed 
elsewhere. For example John Joliffe, one of the supporters of the monument did not hesitate 
to accuse “the British government and their advisors of merciless inhumanity.” By this he 
meant “the hypocrisy and feebleness of progressive leftists who turned a blind eye to the 
communist enslavement of Eastern Europe.”36 This clearly did not include those senior 
Conservative figures like Churchill and Eden who had directed British foreign policy at the 
time. On the face of it this also excluded the more junior figure of Harold Macmillan who 
was now emerging as the “prime suspect” in the British discussion. Ennobled as Lord 
Stockton, Macmillan was the most senior figure still alive who had played some part in the 
decision-making of May 1945 (exactly what part was disputed). He also embodied the “wet” 
consensual brand of conservatism which was now under attack by Thatcherites. For his part, 
in a much publicised speech in November 1984, Macmillan compared the government’s 
privatisation policies to “selling off the family silver.”37 This may explain why direct attack 
on him by Tolstoy, first published in Encounter under the title “The Klagenfurt conspiracy” 
was now taken up on the “dry” fringes of the Conservative party.38  In 1986 the magazine of 
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the Federation of Young Conservatives published a cover page photograph of Macmillan 
(from 1945) with the superimposed question “Guilty of War Crimes?” In the course of the 
row which followed the party chairman Norman Tebbit ordered the magazine to be 
withdrawn. 
 
5. Bleiburg returns to the Heimat 
 
The swelling British controversy also had echoes in the German and Austrian media. The 
way Bleiburg was then (re)-imported can be seen as a “transnational moment” in which 
existing forms of commemoration and their associated values were changed but also 
validated.39 In some ways the often self-critical British debate endorsed the sense of righteous 
grievance expressed in diaspora commemoration.40  For example a Cossack veterans’ journal 
welcomed the London memorial as a recognition, however belated, of Cossack suffering, 
even though it emphasised that nothing could make them forget the “suffering and death of 
countless comrades in Siberia.”41 Karl-Gottfried Vierkorn, one of the most active Cossack 
spokesmen, urged his comrades to accept the British gesture as a fitting if belated memorial 
to “our cruelly killed German and Cossack comrades in the Siberian earth.” He also cited 
Jolliffe’s explanation that the project had been inspired by Brandt’s famous gesture of 
abnegation (Kniefall) at the Warsaw ghetto. Although he implied that the comparison might 
appear provocative to his fellow veterans Brandt’s acceptance of German guilt was evidently 
less objectionable to Vierkorn in this context than the implication that British had accepted 
their guilt for a crime which was comparable with that of Poland’s Jews.42 Vierkorn’s 
comment also points to the way that diaspora and Heimat commemoration were now 
becoming aligned. On the extreme right of the Heimat spectrum British action was now being 
established as an allied war crime, its criminal status confirmed by the British themselves; it 
featured alongside the bombing of Dresden and the Katyn massacre in an Allies “hall of 
infamy”. In the words of the Carinthian journalist Ingomar Pust it was “one of the biggest and 
hitherto unexpiated crimes of human history.”43 Andreas Mölzer wrote in a similar vein.44  
This perspective,  albeit somewhat toned down, began to influence more mainstream 
accounts. In the relevant part of Hugo Portisch’s acclaimed series Österreich II, for example, 
Comment [A5]: Italic? 
13 
 
two strands are intertwined. One is the story of western weakness at Yalta, which is linked 
(rather tenuously) to Austrian neutrality and the question of repatriations payments. The 
other, as suggested by the chapter title “the overrun country” (“das überlaufene Land”), is the 
theme of a small country overwhelmed by three million foreigners. Admittedly Portisch 
concludes with the moderately liberal comment that the country had “survived” this 
experience (“Und das Land hat es ausgehalten” (359)), but what is striking is the absence of 
any Austrian actors. When it comes to the Cossacks, Portisch’s account comes tantalisingly 
close to the important but neglected point that the leadership of the Cossacks was in the hands 
of German and Austrian officers (“Rahmenpersonal”). But in the interview with one of those 
officers, the Carinthian landowner Leopold Goess, the focus is firmly on Cossack suffering 
and British duplicity. Goess’s explanation for the large number of Austrian officers takes 
readers (listeners) back to the well-known stereotype of Austrians as able to “deal with 
foreign peoples better than the Prussians.”45 Yet Goess would have been a valuable witness 
on the basic question which has rarely been posed in the Austrian discussion: what did the 
Cossacks do before they arrived in Carinthia? The widespread image of exotic soldiers, 
motivated only by a love of freedom and a hatred of communism, could hardly have survived 
even a brief look at the memoirs of Goess’s fellow officer Erwein zu Eltz, Mit den Kosaken. 
As well as detailing Cossack depredations in Croatia (Slavonia) these privately published 
diaries also point to the responsibility of the German and Austrian leaders of the Cossacks.46 
The omission of this perspective is not an accident. Goess himself showed this when he 
helped integrate the Cossacks into Carinthian Heimat commemoration. As the sponsor of the 
Ulrichsberg commemoration site he lobbied for recognition of the Cossacks as “Slavs who 
were linked by fate” (“schicksalverbundenen Slawen”). In 1991 a memorial plaque to 
Helmuth von Pannwitz (the commander of the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps was erected in the 
grove of honour/Ehrenhain.47  
By the 1980s diaspora commemoration of a different kind was also beginning influence the 
Yugoslav discussion. While the communist party establishment blocked any discussion one 
of the earliest and most trenchant interventions came in the memoirs of the veteran 
communist dissident Milovan Djilas.48 In it Djilas also raised the “puzzle” of British 
decision-making, though in a different form than Solzhenitsyn, when he commented that he 
and his fellow partisan leaders had not understood why the British had agreed to hand over 
their enemies since “the great majority of the people the British forced back from Austria 
Comment [r16]: I am not sure what 
this means. 
Comment [A7]: I presume a kind of 
Wagnerian wood! i.e. grove 
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were simple peasants.”49 The steady erosion of Yugoslavia’s federal structures following 
Tito’s death shortly afterwards provided more space for survivor testimony, including that of 
the diaspora. Although open discussion of the post-war massacres and Croat victimhood had 
been silenced after the repression of the “Croat spring” in the early 1970s, subterranean links 
between Croation revisionists continued. They expanded in the late 1980s when the former 
communist military historian and later Croatian president Franjo Tudjman visited Canada. He 
and émigré historians and activists like Antje Belo agreed that Bleiburg had been a genocide 
which fitted into a malign anti-Croat Greater Serb tradition.50  Meanwhile in Slovenia a first 
step towards discussion had been taken in 1975 when Edvard Kocbek published his 
indictment of the post-war massacres of the Domobranci in a Triest magazine.51 Kocbek’s 
criticism was taken up in the 1980s by among others  the writer Drago Jančar and the editors 
of the journal Nova Revija, who called for a scrutiny of the post-war killings in the name of 
national (Slovene) reconciliation.52 The British discussion - both Nikolai Tolstoy and the 
attack by the British journalist, Nora Beloff on Tito’s “flawed legacy” - also had some impact 
on this developing Slovene discussion.53 
At the end of the 1980s some of these strands came together in a London courtroom. Lord 
Aldington, who as Toby Low had been the second most senior British officer in Carinthia, 
sued Nikolai Tolstoy for libel. His action was triggered by a flyer which Tolstoy (and Nigel 
Watts) had distributed widely and which repeated many of the charges already contained in 
Tolstoy’s book The Minister and the Massacres. It implied that Aldington’s failure to 
respond to them meant he was unable to defend himself against the claim that he was “a 
major war criminal, whose activities merit comparison with those of the worst butchers of 
Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia.”54 By taking legal action Aldington was perhaps accepting 
the logic of this last point, but his subsequent victory in court and the award of record 1.5 
million pounds damages (with legal costs) hardly ended the controversy in the way he 
wanted. Although the six week trial did mean that for the first time members of the British 
military and political establishment rubbed shoulders with Serb, Croat and Slovene émigrés 
including survivors of the hand-overs (or their children and grandchildren), procedural and 
legal constraints meant that it never became anything like a truth and reconciliation 
commission. Many observers saw the verdict as proof of a corrupt judicial process, an 
establishment cover-up, collective national denial or an attempt to limit freedom of speech.55 
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6. Post-script  
 
The discussions of the hand-overs in the twenty years since the Tolstoy-Aldington trial 
cannot easily be summarised. One reason it is hard to detect a pattern is the sheer volume of 
material which the internet has now made accessible. Googling “Bleiburg massacre”, for 
example, produces nearly 8,000 hits while “victims of Yalta” leads to over 60,000.56 It seems 
doubtful that this volume of opinion, in which every view spawns countless refutations and 
clones, has in sum produced more “open-minded and even-handed use of the evidence.” The 
greatest such contribution was surely the work of the unofficial “Cowgill Inquiry”57  though 
it, like the outcome of the Aldington-Tolstoy trial, has also been criticised as an establishment 
cover-up.58  
Nevertheless four tentative concluding comments can be offered here. Firstly, as diaspora 
Yugoslav perspectives “returned” to the disintegrating Yugoslav state they injected a further 
historical element into an increasingly hate-filled discussion.59  As Robert Hayden puts it, the 
post-war massacres emerged “from secret history to public knowledge.”60 Ante Beljo, for 
example, moved from Canada to Zagreb where the Croatian Information Centre provided him 
with an institutional base for organising symposia (including one at Bleiburg itself).61 Of 
course, the equation of Stalinist crimes with the Holocaust was not limited to Yugoslavia but 
it was only there that the competitive historical arithmetic of victimhood linked to actual 
revenge or retribution. While Milošević’s policies were seen by Tudjman and his supporters 
as the continuation of Bleiburg, the hand-overs of May 1945 were probably less central to a 
Serb narrative which glorified the Četnik resistance, equated modern Croatia with the Ustaša 
State and concluded that the break-up of Bosnia was both inevitable and necessary.62 In 
Slovenia a government commission was set up to investigate the massacres but public 
opinion was and continues to be deeply divided.63  
Secondly, the perception of the Cossacks as victims tout court seems now to be well 
established in mainstream Austrian (Carinthian) commemoration.64 Most accounts include, in 
various proportions, moral outrage, empathetic accounts of the horrors of the hand-overs and 
a residual bafflement about the reasons for the British decisions.65 Most of them also portray 
the Cossacks (and to a lesser extent the Yugoslavs) as passive victims, whose previous 
careers beyond their suffering under communism are of little interest. In some of the work of 
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Stefan Karner, for example, Cossack victimhood is conflated with that of other quite different 
groups like forced labourers from Eastern Europe. In an article he co-wrote with Susanne 
Hartl the “kidnapped” German Carinthians of May 1945 are also integrated into a narrative 
which in some respects echoes Ingmar Pust: here, too, there is a basic dichotomy between 
bestial partisans and their British helpers on their one hand, and their victims on the other.66  
Austrians are also clearly included in the constructed community of victims when Karner lists 
the fate of the Cossacks along other Soviet misdeeds in Austria (dismantling, the USIA 
industries, plundering, rape). Unlike the Red Army they are not “alien” (“die landfremden 
Truppen”).67 This “austrianisation” of the Cossacks is also evident in some local histories of 
the places where the Cossacks were quartered, or handed over (like Judenburg or Lienz). The 
Heimat here is portrayed as intact and pristine before being suddenly violated by an arbitrary 
and cruel outside world.68 Although it would be unfair to charge Karner with altogether 
ignoring Nazi policy (such as the 1942 deportations of the Carinthian Slovenes), the 
relationship between them and the events of 1945 is not explored. What dominates 
Carinthia’s “real” history is Yugoslavia’s double attempt to incorporate Southern Carinthia.69 
Austrians may appear as horrified observers but are also rarely agents, let alone perpetrators. 
Where there is Austrian agency it takes the form of humanitarian intervention on behalf of 
those threatened with return. Peter Ruggenthaler and Walter Iber even detect this in Austrian 
naturalisation policy. They suggest - in the face of much contrary evidence of the hostility of 
politicians and press towards Displaced Persons (of all kinds) - that one of its main aims was 
to keep Soviet refugees or displaced persons out of the clutches of the Soviet authorities.70  
 
 
Thirdly, the hand-overs are also now embedded in some levels of western (British) “cultural 
memory” even if not in the form of the national expiation called for by Solzhenitsyn. In the 
James Bond film Goldeneye, for example, Lienz returns to haunt the British secret service in 
the form of a renegade agent Alec Trevelyan (played by Sean Bean). Trevelyan betrays 
Britain because Britain has betrayed his Cossacks parents at Lienz.71 Another less well-
known example is Robin Chapman’s novel Wartimes: two stories of World War Two, 
(London 1995) which is described on the cover as a work “of the imagination rooted in fact.” 
The “facts” emerge through an encounter between Tonya, a Russian translator (of Cossack-
Serb extraction) and the British Major Kemp. Tonya explains that the Cossacks fought with 
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the Germans “but not against the British or the Americans....They are too proud to be told 
what to do by anyone. And they have kept their faith in God” (p. 152). Kemp becomes 
sympathetic to the Cossacks as events move to what the cover calls “the purest of tragedies in 
which all were innocent except the powers above them.”72 This pitting of the humane middle-
ranking officer against the ruthlessness of the high-ups can be seen as a variant of Tolstoy’s 
juxtaposition of the ordinary horrified soldier and officer and the more senior conspirators. It 
is also evident in a more recent fictional depiction of forced repatriation broadcast in a recent 
episode of the BBC detective series Foyle’s War. In this case the attempt to repatriate an 
émigré Cossack from a prisoner-of-war camp triggers a murder investigation. Thesetting, the 
British coastal resort of Hastings, is far from Bleiburg, but the narrative is not so distant from 
the topos of the sullied Heimat and here too the Cossacks appear unambiguously as victims. 
According to the summary in the Guardian, although the war is over, Inspector Foyle “is still 
attempting to keep the streets of Hastings clean.” And in the end his detective work and 
stubbornness mean that the values of humanitarianism prevail. 
Fourthly, the unpredictability or arbitrariness of commemoration in the internet age, creates a 
link from Bleiburg to Grozny and the Chechen war. In 2006 the London memorial to the 
victims of Yalta became the focal point of World Chechen Day, commemorating Stalin’s 
deportation of the Chechens to Central Asia in 1944 which resulted in the thousands of 
deaths. There were speakers from all religious groups (Christian, Jewish, Islamic) and 
celebrities like Vanessa Redgrave, who told the meeting that “the Kremlin's Genocide of 
Chechen people has been accepted by Europeans leaders [sic] to the shame of us all, citizens 
of Europe."73 This might suggest a pattern of ecumenical humanitarianism pitted against 
tyranny but the associated blogs and links undermine any such neatness. In one of them the 
Chechen leader Shamil Basayev recalls not just the mass deportations of 1944 but also the 
struggles against the Tsar by “his legendary namesake, Shamil.” Here the Cossacks reappear 
at least by implication, but as enforcers of Tsarist rule rather than victims of Stalin.74 
Overall the post-war trajectory of Bleiburg commemorations suggests that while different 
commemorations (Heimat, diaspora, western establishment) did increasingly cross national 
borders, it was the national context which predominated throughout. Nations, real, imagined 
or hoped for, were implicated, not necessarily deliberately in a competition of victimhood in 
which Nazi and Ustaša crimes functioned sometimes as a bench-mark, sometimes as a 
competitive irritant. The other point of reference for victimhood, the Yalta conference, was 
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applied increasingly promiscuously so that groups who were either not discussed at the Yalta 
conference at all or were actively engaged in fighting against the states represented there 
were labelled “victims of Yalta.” The motif of western treachery, originally applied to Poland 
became extended so that it covered a multitude of sins, including the tricks used by the 
British Army to implement the hand-overs. In the process British decision-making, which the 
evidence suggests was if anything over-determined rather than mysterious, became the 
subject of a variety of conspiracy theories. Last but not least, mythical Cossacks were 
privileged over actual Cossacks;75 the war-time career of those handed over (and their 
German and Austrian officers) was neglected and the far larger number of Cossacks who 
fought and died in the Red Army in order to defeat Nazi Germany were almost completely 
ignored.  
 
 
                                                                 
1  
2 For a recent discussion see Stevan Pavlovitch, Hitler’s New Disorder. The Second World 
War in Yugoslavia, London 2008, 262.  
3 Robert Knight, Harold Macmillan and the Cossacks: was there a Klagenfurt Conspiracy? in: 
Intelligence and National Security, 1 (1986) 2, 251-2; see also Robert Knight, Einige 
vergleichende Betrachtungen zur "Vergangenheitsbewältigung" in Österreich und 
Großbritannien, in: Zeitgeschichte 15 (1987) 2, 63-71; Nikolai Tolstoy, The Minister and the 
Massacres, London 1986; Robert Knight, Tragedy of the rough and ready, in: Times Literary 
Supplement, 13. 6. 1986, 639; for a recent assessment see D.R. Thorpe, Supermac: the life of 
Harold Macmillan, London 2010, 207-231. 
4 Claus Leggewie, Battlefield Europe: Transnational memory and European identity, in 
Eurozine URL: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-04-28-leggewie-en.html [accessed 10 
April 2010]. Leggewie’s other “circles” are the Armenian genocide, European periphery, 
Europe as migration continent and Europe’s post-war success story. 
5 Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars, Ithaca/London 
2003, 24-5. 
19 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
6 Preface to Bor M. Karapandžič, Kočevje: Tito’s bloodiest crime 1945-1985, Cleveland 
1965, 7. On Slovene diaspora memory see John Corsellis and Marcus Ferrar, Slovenia 1945: 
memories of death and survival after World War II, London 2005. 
7 Karapandžič, 14. For Croat diaspora publications see i.a. John Prcela and Stanko Guldescu 
(eds.), Operation Slaughterhouse. Eyewitness Acounts of Postwar Massacres in Yugoslavia, 
Philadelphia 1970; Ivo Omrcanin, Dramatis Personae and Finis – Independent State of 
Croatia in American and British Documents, Bryn Mawr 1983.  
8 Hockenos, Homeland, 28, 62 (note 5). 
9 Nikolai Krasnov, The Hidden Russia: My Ten years as a slave Labourer, New York 1960; 
also A Petrovksy, Unvergessener Verrat!, Munich 1965; for a useful survey of diaspora 
literature on Vlasov see Catherine Andreyev, Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: 
Soviet reality and émigré theories (Soviet and East European Studies 51), Cambridge 1987, 
1-18. 
10 Martin Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf 1918-1920, (improved reissue of 1943 edition), 
(Archiv für Vaterländische Geschichte und Topographie 69) Klagenfurt 1985, 472 (Annex 
III). 
11 Christian Pichler,  Politische Gedenktage und die deutchsprachige Kärntner Press (1945-
2000), in: Ulfried Burz/Heinz-Dieter Pohl (eds.), Politische Festtagskultur in Kärnten: 
Einheit ohne Einigkeit? (Kärnten und die Nationale Frage 3) Klagenfurt 2005, 171-274. 
12 Volkszeitung, 12. 10. 1960 (An der Grenze nicht Bunker, sondern Kultur!) (“dass es ohne 
den Freiheitskampf der Kärntner keine Volksabstimmung gegeben hätte.”) 
13 See Walter Fanta and Valentin Sima, “Stehts mitten drin im Land”: Das europäische 
Kameradentreffen auf dem Kärntner Ulrichsberg von den Anfängen bis heute, Klagenfurt 
2003, 83-7. 
14 Hanns Haas and Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Österreich und seine Slowenen, Vienna 1977, 26-38. 
15 See Stefan Karner and Susanne Hartl, Die Verschleppungen von Kärntnern 1945 durch 
jugoslawische Partisanen, in Stefan Karner and Andreas Moritsch, (eds.), Aussiedlung – 
Verschleppung- nationaler Kampf, (Kärnten und die Nationale Frage1) Klagenfurt 2005, 53-
20 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
78. According to table 1 out of a total of 263 arrested 96 were not seen again, out of the 180 
of these  who were arrested in the Bleiburg area, 64 never returned. 
16Karl Newole (Landesamtsdirektor) to Marcus Leitmaier (BKA AA), 13. 8. 1949, covering 
Gutachten über das Memorandum des jugoslawischen Aussenministeriums etc ÖStA, AdR, 
BKA/AA, II-pol (Staatsvertrag 2c), Zl. 86.397, (GZl. 80.797-pol/49) (emphasis added). 
Newole was strongly resisting a Yugoslav call for an extensive Slovene autonomy based on 
the 1910 census results. 
17 See Lisa Rettl, PartisanInnen-denkmäler: Antifaschistische Erinnerungskultur in Kärnten, 
(Der Nationalsozialismus und seine Folgen 3) Innsbruck 2006, especially chapter 12. 
18Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-45, Göttingen 1956, 193; see also Erich 
Kern, General von Pannwitz und seine Kosaken, Oldendorf 1971. 
19 Volkszeitung, 30.4.1960 (40,000 Kosaken bedrohten Oberkärnten). 
20 Theodor Veiter, Das Recht der Volksgruppen und Sprachminderheiten in Österreich 
Vienna 1970, 703. 
21 George Orwell, ‘The Prevention of Literature,’ in Polemic, (1946) 2, [URL: 
http://orwell.ru/library/essays/prevention/english/e_plit accessed on 20 April 2010] 
22 Donald Cameron Watt, Britain and the Historiography of the Yalta Conference and the 
Cold War,’ in: Diplomatic History 13 (1989) 1, 77-81. 
23 Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches, London 1949, 402-3. Maclean makes no mention of 
the hand-overs or post-war massacres in his book. On Yalta in the USA see Bernd Stöver, 
Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus. Amerikanische Liberation Policy im Kalten Krieg 1947-
1991, Köln/Weimar/Wien 2002, 638-42. 
24 Hockenos, Homeland, (note 5) 62. 
25 E.g. Patrick Scott Faugh-a-Ballagh (Regimental Gazette of the Royal Irish Fusilliers) July 
1946. 
26 Among diary accounts are those of the Red Cross official John Selby-Bigge, (still 
unpublished), the Labour politician Tony Crosland, Tony Crosland, London 1982 and the 
author and publisher Nigel Nicolson, Long Life. Memoirs, London 1997. 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
27 Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War (1939-1945), London 1969, 17-18; Harold 
Macmillan, War diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean January 1943-May 1945,  
London  1984, 757-8 (entry for 13 May 1945).  
28 D.R. Thorpe, (note 3) Supermac, 588.; see Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1894-1956, London 
1988, 259-60.  
29 Macmillan, War diaries, 757-8. 
30 Alexander Solzhenitizyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956 vol. 1, (translated Thomas P 
Whitney) London 1974, 261-2. Emphasis  in original. 
31 BBC interview, 17 November 1974, cited by Michael Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, a 
biography, New York 1984, 899..  
32 Solzhenitisyn, Gulag, 259-60.  
33 Scammell (note 31, 899), implies that Solzhenitsyn thought almost the entire émigré 
population of one and a half million or two million had been repatriated. 
34 Bethell, The last Secret. Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944-7, London 1974, 245. 
35 Tolstoy, Minister and the Massacres, (note 3) xv-xvi.   
36 Review by Raymond Carr, Spectator, 4. 3. 2009 of John Jolliffe, The Spice of Life, London 
2009. 
37 See Thorpe, Supermac, 603-4; Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986 (vol. II), London 
1989, 122-129. 
38 Nikolai Tolstoy, The Klagenfurt Conspiracy, in: Encounter LX (1983), 24-37. 
39 Nicholas Bethell, Das letzte Geheimnis. Die Auslieferung russischer Flüchtlinge an die 
Sowjets durch die Alliierten 1944-47, Berlin 1975, reviewed in Die Zeit by Wolfgang 
Leonhard, 10. 9. 1975. 
40 See for example the pro-Četnik account by Žika Rad. Prvulovich, Serbia between the 
Swastika and the Red Start, Birmingham 1986.  
22 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
41 Kosaken-Schatten über England in: Nachrichten der Kameradschaft des XV. Kossaken-
Kavalerie Korps, 34, 6.(“das späte Einsehen in der britischen Öffentlichkeit ist durchaus 
beifallswürdig und achtbar – vergessen lassen sich die Leiden und der Tod ungezählter 
Kameraden in Siberien dadurch aber nicht.”) 
42 Karl-Gottfried Vierkorn, Jalta-Mahnmal in London, in: Nachrichten der Kameradschaft 
des XV. Kossaken-Kavalerie Korps, 41, 4; see also Vierkorn’s account in Andritsch ed. 
Judenburg 1945 in Augenzeugenberichten, Judenburg 2004. 
43 Ingomar Pust, Titostern über Kärnten 1942-1945: Todgeschwiegene Tragödien, Klagenfurt 
1984, 212. 
(“eines der grossen und bisher ungesühnten Verbrechen der Menschheitsgeschichte.”) 
See also the criticism of Andrej Leben/Erwin Köster, Von den primären Quellen zum 
publizistischen Diskurs über den bewaffneten Widerstand der Partisanen in Kärnten in: 
Zeitgeschichte 34 (2007) 4, 226-242. 
44 Andreas Mölzer, Kärntner Freiheit, Ein österreichischer Sonderfall, Vienna/Munich 1990, 
183-188. 
45 Hugo Portisch and Sepp Riff, Österreich Zwei: die Wiedergeburt unseres Staates, Vienna 
1985, (vol 1), 340.  
46 Erwein zu Eltz, Mit den Kossaken. Kriegstagebuch 1943-1945, Donaueschingen 1970; see 
also Peter Broucek, Ein General im Zwielicht: Die Erinnerungen Edmund Glaises von 
Horstenau, Vienna/Cologne/Graz 1988, 371-2. 
47 Fanta and Sima, 16-17 (note 13). Stehts mitten drin im Land” Das europäische 
Kameradentreffen auf dem Kärntner Ulrichsberg von den Anfängen bis heute, Klagenfurt 
2003, 16-17.  
48 Djilas, Wartime, New York 1977. 
49 A conversation between George Urban and Milovan Djilas, in: Encounter, December 1977. 
50 Ante Beljo, Yugoslavia Genocide: a documented Analysis, Sudbury 1985; David Bruce 
Macdonald, Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
war in Yugoslavia, Manchester and New York, 2002, 39-58, 99-103; Hockenos, Homeland, 
20-8 (note 5) 
51 James Gow and Cathie Carmichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes: A small State and the New 
Europe, London 2000, 75-6. 
52 Mark Thompson, A Paper house. The ending of Yugoslavia, London 1992. 
53 See Nikolai Tolstoy, Celovška Zarota, [Klagenfurt conspiracy] Klagenfurt 1983: Nora 
Beloff, Tito’s Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia & the West: 1939–84, London 1985. See also the 
proceedings of a Conference of British and Yugoslav historians at Brdo in 1985, including 
the Slovene translation of the author’s article (note 3) in: Dušan Biber (ed.), Konec druge 
svetovne vojne v Jugoslaviji, Borec, Ljubljana 1986 (12). 
54 Four page flyer, War crimes and the Wardenship of Winchester College n.d. [1989] in 
possession of author. The flyer also saw a disparity between the British Ministry of Defence 
enquiry into allegations that Kurt Waldheim had been involved in the deaths of two British 
soldiers and the failure to act against “the man proved beyond any doubt to have played a 
decisive and unrepentant role in the massacre of 70,000 men, women and children.” 
55 For a pro-Tolstoy account of the trial see Ian Mitchell, The Price of a Reputation, Glasgow 
1997. Eva Menasse’s account of the later prosecution of David Irving, Der Holocaust vor 
Gericht. Der Prozess um David Irving, Berlin 2000, 63-8, though excellent on its main topic 
suffers from an over-reliance on Mitchell. Christopher Booker, A looking-glass tragedy, 
London 1997, is critical of Tolstoy. Having acted as an expert witness to the court on behalf 
of Aldington I readily declare my own interest here. 
56 As of 21 December 2010.  
57 Anthony Cowgill/Tom Brimelow/Christopher Booker, The Repatriations from Austria in 
1945 vol. 1. The Report of an Inquiry, vol. 2 The documentary evidence reproduced in full 
from British, American, German and Yugoslav sources, London 1990.  
58 Mitchell, Price (note 55). 
24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
59 Mark Thompson, A Paper House (note 52) ; Oto Luthar, ‘Between Reinterpretation and 
Revisionism. Rethinking Slovenian Historiography of the 1990s, in Ulf Brunnbauer (ed.), 
(Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism, Münster 2004, 
333-350. 
60 Robert M Hayden, Recounting the Dead: the Rediscovery and Redefinition of Wartime 
Massacres in Late- and Post-Communist Yugoslavia in: Rubie Watson ed., Memory, History 
and Opposition under State Socialism, Santa Fe 1994,167.  
61 See International Symposium for Investigation of the Bleiburg Tragedy Zagreb, Croatia 
and Bleiburg, Austria, May 17 and 18, 1994, Toronto and Zagreb, 1995: Ante Beljo (ed.), An 
International Symposium "Southeastern Europe 1918-1995, Zagreb 2000.  The contributors 
included Nikolai Tolstoy (The Bleiburg Massacres) who sought to avoid national or ethnic 
distinctions among the victims by describing the victims as “terrified people of all ethnic 
categories”. See also Hockenos, Homeland, 27-8, 52-3 (note 5). 
62 Macdonald, 84-5, 138-40; Hockenos, Homeland, 141; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, 
Myth and Destruction of Yugoslavia, New Haven and London 1997, 132-4. 
63 Corsellis/Ferrar, 241-252; 51-5; for accounts which are generally anti-partisan and 
sometimes apologetic of the Domobranci see Drago Jančar, The Dark side of the Moon: a 
short history of Totalitarianism in Slovenia, 1945-1990, Ljubljana 1998, 5-19; Tamara 
Griesser-Pečar, Das zerissene Volk: Slowenien 1941-1946, Okkupation, Kollaboration, 
Bürgerkrieg, Revolution, (Studien zu Politik und Verwaltung 86) Wien/Köln/Graz 2008, 480-
507. 
64 Exceptions are Armin Wilding, Die Kosaken im oberen Drautal und ihre Auslieferung an 
die Sowjetunion 1945, (Studia Carinthiaca 14) Klagenfurt 1999, 37; Martin Kofler, Osttirol 
im Dritten Reich 1938-1945, Innsbruck/Vienna 1996, 233-237. 
65 See for example Wilhelm Wadl, Das Jahr 1945 in Kärnten: Ein Überblick, Klagenfurt 
1985; August  Walzl, Kärnten 1945: Vom NS-Regime zur Besatzungsherrschaft im Alpen-
Adria-Raum, Klagenfurt 1985; Gabriela Stieber, Die Briten als Besatzungsmacht in Kärnten 
1945-1955, (Das Kärntner Landesarchiv 31) Klagenfurt 2005, 57-62. 
25 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
66 Karner and Hartl, Verschleppungen, 53-78 (note 15). Compare this account of Bleiburg to 
Pust, Titostern, 158-161 (note 42). 
67 Die Presse 24. 2. 2001 (Stefan Karner über Vorgespräche mit den Russischen Partnern). 
68 Stefan Karner, Zur Auslieferung der Kosaken an die Sowjets 1945 in: Johann Andritsch 
(ed.),  Judenburg 1945 in Augenzeugenberichten, Judenburg 2004, 243-259; in his 
introduction Andritsch lists the Cossacks handed over, alongside the first refugee camp set up 
by the British for Ost-Juden, the mass rapes, and the transition to democracy by the end of 
the year. 
69 Stefan  Karner/Andreas Moritsch, Zur Einleitung: Der nationale Konflikt, in: Karner ed., 
Kärnten und die Nationale Frage: Aussiedlung – Verschleppung – nationaler Kampf 
(Kärnten und die nationale Frage 1), Klagenurt/Ljublana/Wien, 2005, 10-11. 
70 Peter Ruggenthaler/Walter M. Iber (eds), Hitlers Sklaven – Stalins “Verräter”, Aspekte der 
Repression an Zwangsarbeitern und Kriegsgefangenen: eine Zwischenbilanz, 
Innsbruck/Wien/Bozen 2010, 272-80; see also  Stefan Karner, Exkurs: Zur Auslieferung der 
Kosaken und Vlasov-Kämpfer an die UdSSR, loc.cit, 281-7. 
71 Review by “Mettalluk” at  http://www.epinions.com/review/mvie_mu-
1067989/content_212845301380 [accessed 10 May 2010]. 
72 Robin Chapman, Wartimes: two stories of World War Two, London 1995. 
73 http://www.ihrc.org.uk/show.php?id=1728 [accessed 10 May 2010]. 
74 Blog of Abdur-Raheem Green [URL: 
http://www.islamsgreen.org/islams_green/2006/02/chechnia.html#comments accessed on 25 
April 2010]. See Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History, London 2003, 386-8. 
75 On the other hand Claudio Magris’s fictional story of the Cossack leader Peter Krasnov 
(Mutmaßungen über einen Säbel, Vienna 1986) often appears closer to the “real Cossacks” 
than some historical writing and journalism. 
